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IMG-092        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-1480 
___________ 
 
LIAN ZHANG, 
   Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES 
 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A78-745-724) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Eugene Puglisi 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
July 11, 2012 
Before:  RENDELL, VANASKIE AND GARTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: July 16, 2012) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Lian Zhang, a citizen of the People‟s Republic of China, entered the United States 
in 2000.  He appeared before an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) and conceded that he was 
removable for having entered the country without being admitted or paroled.  See 
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Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) § 212(a)(6)(A)(i) [8 U.S.C. 
§ 1182(a)(6)(A)(i)].  Zhang filed an application for asylum and withholding of removal, 
alleging persecution under China‟s coercive population control policies.  Following a 
merits hearing in 2001, the IJ denied relief.  In 2002, the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(“BIA”) affirmed without opinion.   
 In July 2011, Zhang filed a motion to reopen, asserting that he converted to 
Christianity in 2009 and feared that he would be persecuted in China because of his 
religious beliefs.  The BIA concluded that Zhang‟s conversion was a change in personal 
circumstances, rather than a change in conditions in China that would overcome the time 
limitations for filing a motion to reopen.  Further, the Board considered evidence that 
Zhang had submitted with his motion to reopen, which included affidavits from himself, 
his wife, and his uncle, as well as a human rights organization report concerning religious 
persecution in China.  The Board ultimately concluded that while “[t]here is no dispute 
that some Christians in China have faced harassment, repression, and even persecution, 
. . . that has been true continuously since the time of [Zhang‟s] hearing and for many 
years previously.”  Accordingly, the BIA denied the motion to reopen.  Zhang filed a 
counseled petition for review.   
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to INA § 242(a) [8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)], and review 
the BIA‟s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion.  Patel v. Att‟y Gen., 639 
F.3d 649, 651 (3d Cir. 2011).  Under this standard, the BIA‟s decision may be reversed 
only if it is “arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.”  Sevoian v. Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 166, 
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174 (3d Cir. 2002).  An alien generally may file only one motion to reopen and must file 
it with the BIA “no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative 
decision was rendered.”  8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).  The time and number requirements do 
not apply to motions that rely on evidence of “changed country conditions,” INA 
§ 240(c)(7)(C)(ii) [8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii)], or “changed circumstances arising in 
the country of nationality . . . if such evidence is material and was not available and could 
not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.”   8 C.F.R. 
§ 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).   
 Zhang‟s motion to reopen, filed more than nine years after the BIA entered the 
final removal order, was clearly untimely.  The BIA also properly held that Zhang‟s 
conversion to Christianity was a change in his personal circumstances, not a change in 
country conditions that would support reopening.  Liu v. Att‟y Gen., 555 F.3d 145, 150-
51 (3d Cir. 2009).  We have recognized, however, that an alien who has been ordered 
removed can file an untimely or successive asylum application based on changed 
personal conditions if the alien can also show changed country conditions in the motion 
to reopen.  Id. at 150.  Thus, Zhang would be eligible to file a second asylum application 
in reopened proceedings based on his Christian faith, if he is able to establish relevant 
changed country conditions since the time of his initial asylum proceedings.  Filja v. 
Gonzales, 447 F.3d 241, 251, 252 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding that change in country 
conditions is measured from time of proceedings before IJ). 
 Zhang argued before the BIA that there has been an increase in human rights 
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abuses committed against members of unregistered churches in China.  In support of this 
contention, Zhang submitted a personal affidavit and statements from his wife and uncle.  
Those submissions described incidents in which Chinese authorities (1) searched his 
families‟ homes and confiscated religious materials that Zhang had sent to them; (2) fined 
and threatened his family; and (3) interrogated his uncle, who had returned to China for a 
visit, about Zhang‟s whereabouts.  Administrative Record (“A.R.”) 25-27, 33, 38.  The 
BIA stated that these documents were entitled to “only minimal weight” because neither 
Zhang nor his wife witnessed these incidents, because the statements did not provide 
specifics about the threats to Zhang, and because they were provided by family members 
for the purpose of the removal proceedings.  The BIA‟s conclusion relied in part on In re 
H-L-H-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 209 (BIA 2010).  In that case, like here, the Board concluded 
that documents submitted by asylum applicants were entitled to minimal weight because 
they were “obtained for the purpose of the hearing.”  Id. at 214.  In H-L-H-, however, the 
documents were also unsigned, unauthenticated, and failed to identify the authors.  Id.  
Those weaknesses do not exist in Zhang‟s affidavits.  Nevertheless, we conclude that the 
BIA did not abuse its discretion in declining to fully credit this evidence.  Chen v. 
Gonzales, 434 F.3d 212, 218 (3d Cir. 2005) (noting that only corroboration was a letter 
from a family member who did not witness incident and who was not subject to cross 
examination).   
 Moreover, even if the affidavits could be credited, they are insufficient to establish 
changed country conditions in China.  The affidavits‟ largely anecdotal descriptions of 
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religious persecution do not demonstrate that conditions had worsened in China for 
Christians since the time of Zhang‟s merits hearing in 2001.  See Shardar v. Att‟y Gen., 
503 F.3d 308, 316 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding that an asylum applicant must make a showing 
of a particularized threat of persecution). 
 In addition, we agree that the documentary evidence submitted with Zhang‟s 
motion to reopen failed to demonstrate that conditions concerning religious persecution 
in China have materially changed since the time of Zhang‟s hearing.  Zhang‟s motion to 
reopen relied primarily on an Annual Report from the China Aid Association (“the 
Report”), which stated that “[a]s it has in each of the previous five years, church 
persecution continued to escalate in 2010.”  Importantly, however, evidence in the record 
from Zhang‟s 2001 merits hearing suggested that harassment and repression of 
unregistered churches were already prevalent.  For example, the 1998 State Department 
Profile of Asylum Claims and Conditions in China (“the Profile”) indicated that 
“[u]nregistered religious activity is illegal and is a punishable offense,” that since 1994 
the police have stepped up a campaign to require all religious groups to register, and that 
the “Government stepped up the pressure on Christians in both the countryside and the 
cities.”  
 The China Aid Association Report provided statistics concerning an overall 
increase in religious persecution in China.  In particular, the Report noted that “[i]n 
addition to continuing with the 2008 and 2009 practice of „targeting house church leaders 
and churches in urban areas,‟ . . . new trends appeared in the persecution of Christian 
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churches in mainland China.”  For instance, “beginning in the latter half of 2010, the 
government began to circumvent regular legal means and instead began to allow law 
enforcement officers to wreak physical and mental havoc on the targets of the persecution 
rather than punishing them through legal and accepted methods.”  Significantly, however, 
Fujian Province, where Zhang‟s family lives, was not listed among the provinces where 
the most severe persecution occurred.  Indeed, it appears that in Fujian Province there 
was one person detained and ten people persecuted during the reporting period.  This is 
relevant because both the Profile and Report suggest that the frequency and severity of 
religious persecution varies across China.  See Profile, A.R. 156 (stating that the “level of 
surveillance and harassment of religious groups varies from region to region and is 
largely dependent upon the local cadre in charge of religious affairs.”); Report, A.R. 60-
76 (describing incidents based on their location).   
 Moreover, the Report does not contradict the Profile‟s conclusion that church 
leaders, rather than church members (like Zhang), are targeted for persecution.  See 
Profile, A.R. 156 (indicating that “[l]eaders of [underground religious] groups were 
targets of harassment, have been detained for lengthy investigations, and in some cases 
churches−or church property−were destroyed.”); Report, A.R. 54 (describing “[t]argeting 
house church leaders” as a “major characteristic[] of persecution in 2010.”).  Finally, we 
reject Zhang‟s assertion that the Board failed to adequately address the evidence he 
submitted in support of his motion to reopen.  While the BIA must consider the evidence 
presented, it need not expressly parse each piece of evidence submitted in its opinion.  
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Zheng v. Att‟y Gen., 549 F.3d 260, 268 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Wang v. BIA, 437 F.3d 
270, 275 (2d Cir. 2006)). 
 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Zhang failed to show that conditions 
for Christians in Fujian Province have materially changed since the time of his 2001 
merits hearing.  Accordingly, we will deny the petition for review.  We also deny as moot 
the Government‟s motion to summarily deny the petition for review.     
